Fifty Years of Public (Dis)Satisfaction with European Governance: Preferences, Europeanization and Support for the EU by van der Veen, A. Maurits
W&M ScholarWorks 
Arts & Sciences Articles Arts and Sciences 
2016 
Fifty Years of Public (Dis)Satisfaction with European Governance: 
Preferences, Europeanization and Support for the EU 
A. Maurits van der Veen 
Coll William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/aspubs 
Recommended Citation 
van der Veen, M. (2015). Fifty years of public (dis) satisfaction with European governance: preferences, 
Europeanization and support for the EU. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 12(1). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts and Sciences at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Articles by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more 
information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
Citation	
	
van	der	Veen,	A.	M.	(2016).	‘Fifty	Years	of	Public	(Dis)Satisfaction	with	European	Governance:	
Preferences,	Europeanization	and	Support	for	the	EU’,	Journal	of	Contemporary	European	Research.	
12	(1),	pp.	566-590.	
	
First	published	at:	www.jcer.net	
Journal	of	Contemporary	
European	Research	
	
Volume	12,	Issue	1	(2016)		
	
	
	
	
 	
 	
	
Research	Article	
Fifty Years of Public (Dis)Satisfaction with 
European Governance: Preferences, 
Europeanization and Support for the EU 
A.	Maurits	van	der	Veen,	College	of	William	and	Mary,	USA	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Volume	12,	Issue	1	(2016)	 	 A.	Maurits	van	der	Veen	
	 567	
Abstract	
Since	its	beginnings	in	the	1950s,	the	policymaking	scope	and	authority	of	the	European	Union	have	
dramatically	 expanded	 across	 a	wide	 range	 of	 issue	 areas.	 Yet	much	 remains	unknown	 about	 the	
interaction	 between	 public	 preferences	 for	 EU-level	 governance,	 changes	 in	 such	 governance	 and	
overall	support	for	European	integration.	This	article	analyses	surveys	ranging	from	1962	to	2010	to	
show	that	while	support	for	integration	in	different	policy	areas	has	fluctuated	over	time,	it	has	been	
surprisingly	 stable	overall;	moreover,	 the	 relative	preference	ordering	across	 issue	areas	has	been	
even	more	 consistent.	 In	 addition,	 this	 consistency	 is	 not	 affected	by	 changes	 in	 Europeanization,	
nor	 do	 such	 changes	 appear	 to	 be	 driven	 by	 the	 relative	 strength	 of	 preferences.	 Finally,	 issue-
specific	support	for	EU-level	governance	has	an	impact	on	overall	EU	support	that	becomes	stronger	
as	Europeanization	in	that	issue	area	increases,	an	effect	that	increases	further	with	greater	political	
knowledge.	These	findings	call	into	question	understandings	of	rising	Euroscepticism	as	a	reaction	to	
Europeanization	 taking	place	primarily	 in	 areas	where	publics	oppose	 it.	 In	 addition,	 they	 indicate	
that	public	awareness	of	European	integration	is	far	greater	than	political	knowledge	tests	appear	to	
indicate.	
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European	leaders	have	been	interested	in	public	attitudes	regarding	European	integration	since	the	
very	beginning	of	those	efforts,	with	systematic	surveys	dating	back	to	the	early	1960s.	Since	then,	
an	 extensive	 literature	 has	 developed	 investigating	 patterns	 and	 trends	 in	 public	 support	 for	
European	integration.	Surprisingly,	this	literature	has	largely	ignored	both	preferences	for	and	actual	
European	governance	in	specific	policy	areas.	This	is	puzzling,	since	1)	the	activities	of	the	European	
Union	 (EU)	 have	 changed	 dramatically	 over	 time;	 and	 2)	 actual	 or	 perceived	 EU-level	 governance	
activities	in	specific	issue	areas	may	well	affect	public	attitudes	towards	the	EU	as	a	whole.	
Indeed,	 the	 European	Union	 today	 is	 a	 vastly	 different	 institution	 from	 the	 European	 Community	
(EC)	or	Common	Market	of	the	1950s	and	1960s:	not	only	membership,	but	also	policymaking	scope	
and	authority	have	dramatically	expanded.	Someone	whose	preferences	 for	European	governance	
have	remained	constant	over	the	course	of	several	decades	might	well	have	strongly	supported	the	
EU	 at	 one	 point	 only	 to	 become	 a	 fierce	 Eurosceptic	 years	 later.	 The	 opposite	 is	 possible	 too:	
someone	 interested	 only	 in	monetary	 integration	might	 have	 not	 thought	much	 of	 the	 European	
Community	in	the	1960s,	while	supporting	it	wholeheartedly	today.	
This	 article	 investigates	 the	 connections	 between	 1)	 preferences	 for	 European	 governance	 in	
particular	issues	areas;	2)	Europeanization	in	those	issue	areas;	and	3)	overall	support	for	European	
integration:	 asking	 whether	 preferences	 for	 European	 integration	 in	 specific	 areas	 have	 changed	
over	 time.	 Are	 those	 preferences	 affected	 by	 changes	 in	 EU-level	 governance,	 or,	 conversely,	 are	
changes	in	EU-level	governance	driven	by	those	preferences?	And,	perhaps	most	 importantly	 in	an	
era	 of	 rising	 Euroscepticism,	 does	 the	 interaction	 between	 Europeanization	 in	 an	 issue	 area	 and	
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preferences	 regarding	such	Europeanization	 (for	or	against)	have	an	 impact	on	overall	 support	 for	
the	European	Union?	
I	 provide	 evidence	 from	 surveys	 ranging	 from	 1962	 to	 2010,	 showing	 that	 while	 support	 for	
integration	in	different	policy	areas	has	fluctuated	over	time,	it	has	been	surprisingly	stable	overall;	
moreover,	 the	 relative	 preference	 ordering	 across	 issue	 areas	 has	 been	 even	more	 consistent.	 In	
addition,	this	consistency	is	not	affected	by	changes	in	Europeanization,	nor	do	such	changes	appear	
to	be	driven	by	the	relative	strength	of	preferences.	Finally,	issue-specific	support	for	(or	opposition	
to)	 EU-level	 governance	 has	 an	 impact	 on	 overall	 EU	 support	 that	 becomes	 stronger	 as	
Europeanization	 in	 that	 issue	area	 increases,	 an	effect	 that	 increases	 further	with	greater	political	
knowledge.	
These	 findings	 challenge	 the	 conventional	 wisdom	 in	 two	 areas.	 First,	 arguments	 about	
Euroscepticism	 (especially	 ‘soft	 Euroscepticism’1)	 often	 invoke	 the	 notion	 that	 publics	 have	 grown	
increasingly	 sceptical	 of	 further	 integration,	 even	 though	 they	 supported	 initial	 integration	 efforts	
(e.g.	 Eichenberg	 and	Dalton	 2007).	 However,	 this	 claim	 is	 compatible	 only	with	 integration	 taking	
place	 primarily	 in	 areas	 where	 issue-specific	 preferences	 tend	 to	 run	 against	 (further)	
Europeanization.	 In	fact,	that	 is	not	how	integration	has	evolved	over	time:	 integration	takes	place	
just	as	often	in	policy	areas	where	publics	are	supportive.	
Second,	 scholars	 have	 long	 been	 concerned	 about	 low	 levels	 of	 knowledge	 about	 the	 European	
Union	among	EU	citizens,	and	the	implications	thereof	for	voter	competence	(Clark	2014;	de	Vries,	
van	der	Brug,	van	Egmond	and	van	der	Eijk	2011;	Hobolt	2007).	However,	 if	Europeanization	 in	an	
area	affects	the	influence	of	issue-specific	preferences	on	overall	EU	support,	this	implies	that	voters	
are	 somehow	aware	of	Europeanization,	even	 if	 they	 score	poorly	on	 tests	of	political	 knowledge.	
The	findings	here	thus	call	into	question	the	value	of	such	tests	for	gauging	awareness	of	important	
policies,	 while	 simultaneously	 offering	 a	 more	 positive	 picture	 of	 public	 awareness	 of	 European	
integration.	
The	 article	 proceeds	 in	 four	 steps.	 The	 first	 section	 briefly	 reviews	 the	 literature	 on	 issue-specific	
governance	preferences	of	EU	citizens.	 The	 second	 section	 introduces	 the	data	used:	measures	of	
issue-specific	integration	and	of	popular	support	for	issue-specific	and	overall	European	integration	
from	the	early	1960s	to	2010.	The	third	section	analyses	the	connection	between	changes	over	time	
in	 issue-specific	 integration	 and	 issue-specific	 governance	 preferences.	 Finally,	 the	 fourth	 section	
links	those	two	factors	to	overall	support	for	European	integration.	
	
THEORISING	PREFERENCES	FOR	ISSUE-SPECIFIC	EU	GOVERNANCE	
The	 determinants	 of	 public	 support	 for	 European	 integration	 are	 the	 subject	 of	 an	 extensive	
literature	which	has	produced	a	number	of	 important	 findings.	Among	others,	 support	 for	 the	EU	
has	been	shown	to	be	affected	by	demographic	variables	such	as	age	and	gender,	by	socio-economic	
variables	such	as	education	level	and	type	of	employment,	by	nationality	and	identification	with	or	
attachment	 to	 Europe,	 and	 by	 contextual	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 current	 (and	 expected)	 economic	
outlook	(see	e.g.	Boomgaarden,	Schuck,	Elenbaas	and	de	Vreese	2011;	Eichenberg	and	Dalton	1993;	
Gabel	1998;	Hooghe	and	Marks	2005;	Wessels	1995).	Moreover,	notwithstanding	many	changes	 in	
its	 governance	 over	 the	 decades,	 overall	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 European	 Union	 have	 remained	
surprisingly	stable	over	 time	(Franklin	and	Wlezien	1997),	and	the	original	six	member	states	have	
tended	to	be	the	most	consistently	supportive	of	integration	(Anderson	and	Kaltenthaler	1996).		
Preferences	 for	 integration	 in	 specific	 issue	 areas	 have	 received	 less	 attention	 in	 the	 literature.	
Eichenberg	and	Dalton,	considering	the	time	period	1989-2002,	found	preferences	to	be	consistent	
over	time,	with	 ‘the	rank	order	of	preferences	remain[ing]	very	much	the	same	from	year	to	year’	
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and	high	support,	 in	particular,	for	foreign	policy	(including	development	cooperation).	 In	contrast,	
citizens	 seem	 less	 interested	 in	 EU	 governance	 over	 ‘policies	 for	 maintaining	 and	 distributing	
standards	of	living’	(Eichenberg	and	Dalton	2007:	142;	cf.	also	Green	2001).	Hooghe,	similarly,	noted	
that	 European	 publics	 as	 well	 as	 elites	 are	 ‘least	 enthusiastic	 about	 Europeanizing	 high-spending	
policies’	 (Hooghe	2003:	 281),	while	Ahrens,	Meurers	 and	Renner	 (2007)	 identify	 the	 least	popular	
areas	for	European	integration	as	those	that	‘represent	issues	of	national	identity’	or	‘can	clearly	be	
regarded	most	efficient	when	decentralised	decisions	are	taken’	(Ahrens,	Meurers	and	Renner	2007:	
460).	
Finally,	 Clark	 and	Hellwig	 found	 that	 in	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 EU	member	 states,	 and	 for	 nearly	 all	
issue	areas,	a	lack	of	knowledge	reduces	support	for	issue-specific	integration.	They	found	this	effect	
to	be	greatest	in	issue	areas	involving	cross-border	political	issues,	where	European	publics	may	be	
less	aware	of	EU	initiatives	than	is	the	case	for	more	‘traditional’	economic	issue	areas	in	integration	
(Clark	and	Hellwig	2012).	
The	present	study	advances	the	literature	by	investigating	for	the	first	time	the	connections	between	
issue-specific	 European	 governance,	 preferences	 for	 such	 governance,	 and	 overall	 support	 for	
European	integration,	and	by	covering	a	longer	period	of	time	than	preceding	studies.	This	makes	it	
possible	to	investigate	further	the	stability	of	public	preferences	over	time	and,	more	importantly,	to	
see	 whether	 such	 preferences	 have	 any	 impact	 on	 integration	 or,	 conversely,	 integration	 has	 an	
impact	on	those	preferences.	In	addition,	the	study	examines	whether	issue-specific	integration	has	
an	impact,	mediated	through	preferences	for	such	integration,	on	overall	public	support	for	the	EU.	
In	other	words:	publics	may	not	be	enthusiastic	about	 the	Europeanization	of	high-spending	 issue	
areas,but	does	an	increase	in	the	Europeanization	of	such	areas	reduce	their	overall	support	for	the	
EU?	Or,	conversely,	if	citizens	do	support	Europeanization	of	an	issue	area,	does	their	support	of	the	
EU	 increase	 with	 greater	 EU-level	 governance	 in	 that	 area?	 As	 I	 shall	 show,	 the	 answer	 to	 both	
questions	is	‘yes’.		
The	preceding	discussion	gives	rise	to	five	hypotheses	about	the	relationships	between	preferences,	
integration,	 and	 support.	 First,	 I	 aim	 to	 verify	 the	 same	 consistency	 of	 preferences	 that	 other	
scholars	have	 found,	even	over	 the	 longer	 time	period	examined	here.	 In	addition,	 the	stability	of	
preferences	 suggests	 that	 they	 are	 not	 measurably	 affected	 by	 changes	 in	 European	 integration.	
Second,	 and	 conversely,	 changes	 in	 issue-specific	 governance	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 driven	 by	 public	
preferences.	 The	 logic	 of	 democratic	 representation	 suggests	 that	 governments	 should	 be	
responsive	to	public	preferences	(e.g.	Ahrens,	Meurers	and	Renner	2007).	However,	integration	was	
long	 supported	 by	 a	 ‘permissive	 consensus’	 which	 placed	 few	 pressures	 or	 constraints	 on	
governments	 in	 this	 respect	 (cf.	Hooghe	and	Marks	2008),	and	while	 this	consensus	has	eroded	 in	
recent	years,	European	integration	has	not	been	a	salient	driver	of	national	electoral	outcomes	(de	
Vries	2007).	
H1	—		 Preferences	for	issue-specific	EU	governance	are	stable	over	time	and	are	not		
	 affected	by	changes	in	such	governance	
H2	—		 Changes	in	issue-specific	EU	governance	are	not	shaped	by	public	preferences	 
	 for	such	governance	
The	next	hypothesis	addresses	the	 impact	of	the	 interaction	between	preferences	and	governance	
on	 generalised	 support	 for	 European	 integration.	 First,	 and	 most	 straightforwardly,	 I	 expect	 that	
support	for	issue-specific	Europeanization	should	have	an	impact	on	support	for	integration	overall	
(cf.	 Cerniglia	 and	 Pagani	 2009).	 In	 fact,	 the	 opposite	 ought	 to	 be	 true	 too:	 opposition	 to	 EU-level	
governance	 in	an	 issue	area	ought	 to	 reduce	overall	 support.2	Second,	Europeanization	 in	an	 issue	
area	ought	 to	 strengthen	 this	 effect:	 someone	who	 supports	 European	 governance	 in	 a	 particular	
issue	area	ought	to	 like	the	EU	more	overall	 if	such	governance	 is	 (or	becomes)	a	fact.	Finally,	 this	
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relationship	clearly	depends	on	a	respondent’s	awareness	of	Europeanization;	therefore,	the	effect	
ought	to	be	stronger	among	respondents	with	greater	political	knowledge.	
H3	—	 Issue-specific	support	for	(opposition	to)	EU-level	governance	has	a	positive	 
	 (negative)	effect	on	overall	EU	support	 
H4	—	 The	size	of	this	effect	increases	with	the	extent	of	European	integration	in	that	issue	area	
H5	—	 The	size	of	this	effect	increases	with	an	individual’s	knowledge	about	European	integration.	
 
DATA	
As	 the	 other	 contributors	 to	 this	 special	 issue	 show,	 it	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 delineate	 precisely	 the	
competences	 of	 the	 European	Union	 at	 any	 particular	moment,	 let	 alone	 their	 development	 over	
time.	Lindberg	and	Scheingold	 introduced	a	classification	of	competences	 in	terms	of	scope	(policy	
areas)	and	locus	(EU-level	vs.	national-level	decision-making).	However,	it	was	often	hard	to	identify	
‘the	 relative	 importance	 of	 Community	 decision-making	 processes	 as	 compared	 with	 national	
processes’	 (Lindberg	 and	 Scheingold	 1970:	 68).	 Their	 solution	 was	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 formal,	 legal	
competences	of	the	EC	institutions,	but	those	are	often	somewhat	ambiguous	as	well.3		
Schmitter	 improved	 on	 this	model	 by	 focusing	 on	 level	 rather	 than	 locus	 of	 integration,	with	 the	
level	ranging	from	exclusive	national	competence	to	exclusive	EU	competence	(1996).	This	makes	it	
a	 bit	 easier	 to	 take	 into	 account	 that	 the	 EU’s	 ‘governance	 of	 governance’	 takes	 many	 different	
forms,	 hierarchical	 and	 non-hierarchical	 as	 well	 as	 more	 or	 less	 formal	 (Tömmel,	 this	 issue).4	
Limitations	notwithstanding,	the	legal	treaty	texts	do	represent	the	best	single	source	of	information	
about	 the	 scope	 and	 extent	 of	 EU-level	 governance.	 Everything	 else	 —	 directives,	 regulations,	
expenditures,	 and	 even	 non-hierarchical	 and	 informal	 policies	 and	 agreements	—	builds	 on	 these	
basic	foundations.		
Moreover,	the	treaty	texts	have	the	advantage	of	permitting	judgments	as	to	the	importance	of	EU-
level	decision-making	relative	to	the	national	 level.	Accordingly,	 I	use	the	two-part	measure	of	EU-
level	competence	produced	by	Börzel	(2005)	based	on	Schmitter’s	categorisation:	level	of	authority	
(whether	or	not	the	EU	has	exclusive	competence	or	shares	it	with	the	national	level);	and	scope	of	
authority	(how	decisions	are	made	at	the	EU	level).5	Börzel’s	measure	of	level	of	EU	authority	ranges	
from	exclusive	national	competence	(1)	to	exclusive	EU	competence	(5),	while	the	measure	of	scope	
of	EU	authority	ranges	from	no	coordination	(0)	to	unilateral	decision-making	by	the	Commission	(or	
the	European	Central	Bank)	(5).	In	order	to	obtain	a	single	value	for	each	issue	area,	I	add	the	values	
for	 scope	 and	 level,	 giving	 a	 range	 of	 1-10.	 Table	 1	 displays	 the	 data,	 covering	 18	 different	 issue	
areas.		
In	 most	 of	 these,	 EU	 governance	 has	 expanded	 considerably	 over	 time;	 the	 only	 area	 where	 no	
change	has	taken	place	is	taxation.	Exactly	half	of	the	issue	areas	were	at	the	minimum	possible	level	
in	1957;	just	one	issue	—	monetary	policy	—	is	at	the	maximum	possible	level	as	of	the	1997	Treaty	
of	Amsterdam;6	occupational	health	and	safety	comes	close.	More	importantly,	the	data	are	largely	
congruent	 with	 the	 overall	 impressions	 that	 emerge	 from	 this	 issue’s	 articles,	 including	 those	 on	
external	relations	(Dominguez)	and	energy	policy	(Eckert).		
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Table	1.	Data	about	EU-Level	Governance	Authority	(Börzel	2005:	222-223).	
Nr	 Treaty	Issue	 1957	Rome	
1986	
SEA	
1992	
Maastricht	
1997		
Amsterdam	
2001	
Nice	 2007	Lisbon	
1	
Foreign	
political	
relations	
1		
(1,0)	
2		
(1.5,0.5)	
4		
(2.5,1.5)	
4.5	
(3,1.5)	
5	
(3,2)	
5	
(3,2)	
2	
Foreign	
economic	
relations	
3.5	
(2,1.5)	
3.5	
(2,1.5)	
7	
(3.5,3.5)	
8	
(4.5,3.5)	
8	
(4.5,3.5)	
8	
(4.5,3.5)	
3	
Crime	/	
domestic	
security	
1	
(1,0)	
1	
(1,0)	
3	
(2,1)	
4.5	
(2.5,2)	
5.5	
(2.5,3)	
6.5	
(2.5,4)	
4	 Civil	affairs	 1	(1,0)	
1	
(1,0)	
5.5	
(2.5,3)	
6.5	
(3,3.5)	
7	
(3,4)	
7.5	
(3.5,4)	
5	
Environment/	
consumer	
protection	
1	
(1,0)	
6	
(3,3)	
7.75	
(4,3-4.5)	
7.75	
(4,3-4.5)	
7.75	
(4,3-4.5)	
7.75	
(4,3-4.5)	
6	
Occupational	
health	&	
safety	
1	
(1,0)	
7	
(3,4)	
7	
(3,4)	
9	
(4.5,4.5)	
9	
(4.5,4.5)	
9	
(4.5,4.5)	
7	 Labour	affairs	 2	(1,1)	
2	
(1,1)	
5.5	
(2,3.5)	
6	
(2,4)	
6	
(2,4)	
6	
(2,4)	
8	 Culture	 1	(1,0)	
1	
(1,0)	
2	
(1,1)	
2	
(1,1)	
2	
(1,1)	
6.5	
(2,4.5)	
9	 Welfare	 1	(1,0)	
1	
(1,0)	
4.5	
(1.5,3)	
5.5	
(1.5,4)	
5.5	
(1.5,4)	
5.5	
(1.5,4)	
10	 R&D	 1	(1,0)	
5	
(1.5,3-4)	
5	
(1.5,3-4)	
5.5	
(1.5,3.5-4.5)	
5.5	
(1.5,3.5-4.5)	
5.5	
(1.5,3.5-4.5)	
11	 Economic	freedoms	
4	
(2,2)	
5	
(2.5,2.5)	
8	
(4.5,3.5)	
8	
(4.5,3.5)	
8	
(4.5,3.5)	
8	
(4.5,3.5)	
12	 Competition	 4.5	(2.5,2)	
5	
(3,2)	
6	
(3,3)	
6	
(3,3)	
7	
(3,4)	
7	
(3,4)	
13	 Energy	&	transport	
3.5	
(1.5,2)	
3.5	
(1.5,2)	
3.5	
(1.5,2)	
3.5	
(1.5,2)	
3.5	
(1.5,2)	
7.5	
(3.5,4)	
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Table	1.	Data	about	EU-Level	Governance	Authority	(Börzel	2005:	222-223).	
Nr	 Treaty	Issue	 1957	Rome	
1986	
SEA	
1992	
Maastricht	
1997		
Amsterdam	
2001	
Nice	 2007	Lisbon	
14	
Macro-
economic	
policy	&	jobs	
3	
(1.5,1.5)	
3	
(1.5,1.5)	
3	
(1.5,1.5)	
5.5	
(2,3.5)	
5.5	
(2,3.5)	
5.5	
(2,3.5)	
15	 Agriculture	 7	(4,3)	
7	
(4,3)	
7	
(4,3)	
7	
(4,3)	
7	
(4,3)	
8.5	
(4,4.5)	
16	 Regional	cohesion	
3.5	
(2,1-2)	
5	
(2,3)	
7.25	
(4,3-3.5)	
7.75	
(4,3-4.5)	
8	
(4,3.5-4.5)	
8	
(4,3.5-4.5)	
17	 Monetary	policy	
1	
(1,0)	
2.5	
(1.5,1)	
8	
(4,4)	
10	
(5,5)	
10	
(5,5)	
10	
(5,5)	
18	 Tax	 3	(1.5,1.5)	
3	
(1.5,1.5)	
3	
(1.5,1.5)	
3	
(1.5,1.5)	
3	
(1.5,1.5)	
3	
(1.5,1.5)	
The	figures	 in	parentheses	are	Börzel’s	 level	and	scope	measures,	respectively;	the	first	number	in	each	cell	 is	their	sum.	For	the	Lisbon	
Treaty	data,	I	use	Börzel’s	figures	for	the	Constitutional	Treaty	
 
The	articles	in	this	issue	on	migration	(Caviedes)	and	citizenship	(Maas)	represent	sub-issues	of	the	
larger	 headings	 identified	 by	 Börzel.	 These	 articles	 illustrate	 the	 difficulty	 of	 measuring	 and	
quantifying	 Europeanization	when	every	major	 issue	 area	 can	be	 subdivided	 into	 sub-areas,	 some	
policy	initiatives	cross	major	areas,	and	all	have	their	own	unique	governance	story	to	tell.	Although	
it	 is	 important	to	be	aware	of	such	 limitations,	 the	data	 in	Table	1	provide	a	key	starting	point	 for	
comparing	those	governance	stories	across	issue	areas,	and	hence	for	investigating	the	connections	
between	governance	and	public	preferences.	
Data	about	 those	preferences	can	be	 found	 in	public	opinion	surveys	going	back	more	 than	half	a	
century.	In	this	article,	I	focus	on	five	surveys:	the	first	in-depth,	cross-national	survey	on	European	
integration	 available,	 from	 1962,	 plus	 four	 Eurobarometer	 (EB)	 surveys.	 I	 include	 the	 first	
Eurobarometer	 survey	 for	 which	 the	 raw	 data	 remain	 available,	 from	 the	 autumn	 of	 1974;	 two	
surveys	held	a	 few	years	before	and	after	 the	ratification	of	 the	Treaty	on	European	Union,	 in	 the	
autumn	of	1989	and	the	autumn	of	1994	respectively;	and	one	conducted	 in	 the	autumn	of	2010,	
after	the	ratification	of	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	in	2009	and	the	beginning	of	the	global	financial	crisis.	
This	 set	 of	 surveys	 offers	 an	 unparalleled	 view	 of	 patterns	 over	 time	 in	 the	 EU	 governance	
preferences	of	European	publics,	and	makes	it	possible	to	evaluate	these	preferences	against	treaty-
driven	changes	in	governance.	
In	1962,	Gallup	International	conducted	a	survey	of	member	state	publics	on	behalf	of	the	European	
Communities	 (Press-	 and	 Information	 Service	 of	 the	 European	 Communities	 2011).	 Largely	
overlooked	 in	 the	 literature,	 this	 survey	 included	numerous	questions	 foreshadowing	 those	 in	 the	
Eurobarometer	surveys.7	In	particular,	question	Q21a	asked	about	support	for	issue-specific	EC-level	
governance	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 tariff	 abolition	 and	 labour	mobility.	Moreover,	 a	 follow-up	 question	
(Q21b)	asked	respondents	 ‘for	each	policy	alternative,	whether	 it	already	has	been	provided	for	 in	
the	European	Common	Market	or	not’	(Q21b).8	
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The	Eurobarometer	survey	series	began	 in	1974,	with	annual	spring	and	autumn	surveys.	The	 first	
survey	 for	 which	 the	 raw	 data	 remain	 available	 today	 is	 EB	 2,	 conducted	 in	 the	 autumn	 of	 1974	
(European	 Commission	 2012a).	 This	 survey	 came	 shortly	 after	 the	 first	 enlargement	 of	 the	 EC,	
offering	a	snapshot	of	the	attitudes	towards	European	governance	held	by	citizens	of	the	original	as	
well	as	the	newer	member	states.	Respondents	were	asked,	for	each	entry	on	a	list	of	problems,	to	
‘tell	me	if,	 in	your	opinion,	 it	would	be	better	to	deal	with	to	[sic]	by	combined	action	through	the	
Common	Market	or	rather	by	an	action	of	our	own	Government	independently	of	other	countries?’	
(Q24).9	The	policy	areas	on	the	list	differed	from	those	in	1962:	 inflation	and	energy	supplies	were	
added,	while	the	abolition	of	tariffs	and	labour	mobility	disappeared.		
In	 the	 autumn	of	 1989,	 EB	 32	 featured	 a	 slightly	 different	 question	 (Q24),	 reading:	 ‘Which	 of	 the	
following	areas	of	policy	do	you	think	should	be	decided	by	the	<national>	government,	and	which	
should	be	decided	 jointly	within	 the	European	Community?’	 (European	Commission	2012b).	Apart	
from	 changing	 the	 last	 word	 to	 ‘Union’,	 the	 question	 has	 remained	 the	 same	 since.	 The	 list	 of	
possible	issue	areas	also	became	increasingly	standardised	while	varying	in	length.	The	1989	survey	
queried	respondents	about	12	issue	areas;	five	years	later,	in	EB	42.0	(Q30)	the	list	had	expanded	to	
18	issues	(European	Commission	2012c).		
Finally,	 EB	 74.2,	 from	 autumn	 2010,	 listed	 20	 policy	 areas,	 split	 across	 two	 questions	 (QA22	 and	
QA23)	 (European	 Commission	 2013).	 In	 addition,	 this	 survey	 included	 a	 question	 testing	 political	
knowledge.	Respondents	were	asked	three	fairly	easy,	factual	questions	about	the	EU	(QA18).	One	
in	three	respondents	answered	all	three	questions	correctly.10	Along	with	the	1962	survey	question	
about	planned	EC	action	in	particular	issue	areas,	this	general	political	knowledge	question	makes	it	
possible	to	test	the	impact	of	knowledge	on	the	link	between	issue-specific	governance	preferences	
and	general	support	for	the	EU.		
Each	survey	used	here	has	one	or	more	questions	about	overall	 support	 for	European	 integration,	
although	 the	 particular	 question	 has	 varied	 over	 time.	 In	 the	 1962	 survey,	 the	 question	 that	
captured	 overall	 support	 was	 ‘To	 what	 extent	 are	 you	 in	 favour	 of	 or	 against	 efforts	 to	 unify	
Europe?’	 (Q8).	 For	 the	 1989	 and	 1994	 surveys,	 I	 use	 a	 very	 similar	 question	 inquiring	 whether	
respondents	 are	 very	 much	 for,	 somewhat	 for,	 somewhat	 against,	 or	 very	 against	 European	
unification.	I	recode	these	two	questions	to	range	from	-2	(very	against)	to	+2	(very	much	for),	with	
those	who	do	not	express	a	preference	at	0.	Unfortunately,	this	question	was	not	asked	in	1974	or	
2010.	 For	 1974	 I	 use	 a	 question	 about	 whether	 one’s	 country’s	membership	 of	 the	 EC	 is	 a	 good	
thing;	 in	 2010,	 neither	 the	 ‘support	 for	 unification’	 nor	 the	 ‘membership	 is	 good’	 questions	were	
asked;	 instead,	 I	 use	 the	 respondent’s	 judgment	 about	 his/her	 country	 having	 benefited	 from	
membership.11	Each	of	these	is	recoded	from	-1	to	+1,	as	the	questions	do	not	allow	respondents	to	
indicate	degree	of	support.	
	
PREFERENCES	FOR	ISSUE-SPECIFIC	EUROPEAN	GOVERNANCE	
Table	 2	 compares	 respondent	 answers	 about	 their	 preferences	 for	 and	 beliefs	 about	 plans	 for	
integration	 in	 particular	 issue	 areas	 to	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 integration	 in	 those	 issue	 areas	 in	 the	
Treaty	 of	 Rome.	 Support	 levels	 are	 quite	 high	 overall,	 with	 the	 notable	 exception	 of	 taxation	 for	
redistribution	to	other	EC	countries	or	to	Africa.	To	arrive	at	a	single	measure	of	support,	I	subtract	
the	 proportion	 of	 respondents	 opposed	 from	 that	 in	 favour;	 support	 level	 is	 thus	 negative	when	
more	 respondents	oppose	EU-level	decision-making	 than	support	 it.	 For	perceptions	—	belief	 that	
an	issue	area	was	already	‘provided	for’	in	the	Treaty	—	I	simply	take	the	proportion	of	respondents	
that	answered	that	question	in	the	affirmative.		
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Table	2.	Integration	of	Governance,	Preferences,	and	Perceptions	in	1962	(N=4774)	
Policy	Area	 Nr	 Support	 Belief	 Actual	
Abolition	of	tariffs	 11	 0.77	 0.62	 4	
Labour	mobility	 11	 0.46	 0.41	 4	
Harmonising	educational	qualifications	 7/8	 0.72	 0.23	 1.5	
Joint	foreign	policy	 1	 0.56	 0.37	 1	
Joint	scientific	research	 10	 0.78	 0.44	 1	
Joint	agricultural	policy	 15	 0.64	 0.52	 7	
Equivalent	social	benefits	 9	 0.76	 0.26	 1	
Taxes	for	redistribution	to	poor	European	regions	
	
16	
	
0.19	
	
0.24	
	
3.5	
Taxes	for	redistribution	to	African	countries	 2	 -0.07	 0.31	 3.5	
	
	
	
	
.	
	
The	 two	policy	areas	most	 respondents	believed	were	already	provided	 for	 in	 the	EC	Treaty,	 tariff	
abolition	 and	 agricultural	 policy,	 accurately	 represent	 the	 focus	of	 European	 integration	 efforts	 at	
the	time.	The	overall	correlation	between	the	final	two	columns	 is	0.50,	which	 is	 just	significant	at	
the	 0.1	 level	 (one-tailed).	 This	 suggests	 that	 even	 though	 (or	 perhaps	 precisely	 because)	 the	
European	Community	was	quite	new	the	public	was	reasonably	well-informed	about	its	efforts.		
Table	3	provides	a	side-by-side	comparison	of	net	support	levels	for	issue-specific	integration	across	
all	 five	 surveys,	 including	 citizens	 of	 all	member	 states	 at	 that	 time.12	Table	 4	 provides	 the	 same	
information,	but	limited	to	citizens	of	the	original	six	member	states.	The	issue	areas	are	listed	in	the	
order	of	the	category	from	Börzel’s	classification	they	most	closely	fit	(shown	in	the	left	column).13	
The	many	blank	entries	in	the	table	reflect	the	fact	that	different	issue	areas	were	included	from	one	
survey	to	the	next.	Nonetheless,	respondents	were	queried	sufficiently	often	about	the	same	issue	
area	at	different	points	in	time	to	make	it	possible	to	draw	some	conclusions.	
	
Table	3.	Mean	Support	Levels	for	EU	Governance	in	Particular	Issues,	1962-2010	
Börzel	 Survey	Issue	Area	 1962	 1974	 1989	 1994	 2010	
1	 Foreign	policy	/	international	influence	 0.56	 0.51	 0.38	 0.42	 	
1	 Security	against	external	threats	/	defence	 	 	 -0.08	 -0.03	 	
Nr	—	Issue	number	from	Börzel’s	coding	scheme	(Table	1).	
Support	—	Mean	support	levels	for	EU	governance	in	particular	issue	areas	
Belief	—	Belief	that	an	issue	area	is	already	‘provided	for’	in	the	Treaty.		
Actual	—	Governance	score	as	of	1957	Treaty,	according	to	Börzel.	
Source:	Press-	and	Information	Service	of	the	European	Communities	2011:	Q21a&b;	Börzel	2005	
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Table	3.	Mean	Support	Levels	for	EU	Governance	in	Particular	Issues,	1962-2010	
Börzel	 Survey	Issue	Area	 1962	 1974	 1989	 1994	 2010	
1	 Defence	&	foreign	affairs	 	 	 	 	 0.37	
1	&	3	 Fight	against	(international)	terrorism	 	 	 	 	 0.71	
2	 Humanitarian	aid	/	helping	countries	in	the	Third	World	 -0.07	 	 0.58	 0.55	 	
3	 Protection	of	computer-based	information	on	individuals	 	 	 -0.17	 	 	
3	 Fighting	crime	 	 	 	 	 0.33	
3	 Fight	against	drugs	 	 	 	 0.44	 	
4	 Media	(broadcasting	and	press)	 	 	 -0.02	 -0.11	 	
4	 Workers'	reps.	on	company	boards	 	 	 -0.23	 -0.26	 	
4	 Immigration	policy	 	 	 	 0.04	 0.24	
4	 Political	asylum	 	 	 	 0.11	 	
5	 Environment	/	pollution	 	 0.40	 0.30	 0.23	 0.42	
5	 Consumer	protection	 	 	 	 	 0.07	
6	 Occupational	health	and	safety	 	 	 	 -0.23	 	
7	&	8	 Education	 0.72	 	 -0.34	 -0.42	 -0.29	
8	 Cultural	policy	 	 	 	 -0.31	 	
9	 Health	and	social	welfare	 0.76	 	 -0.24	 -0.41	 -0.21	
9	 Challenges	of	aging	population	/	pensions	 	 	 	 	 -0.43	
10	 Scientific	research	 0.78	 	 0.63	 0.50	 0.53	
11	 Abolition	of	tariffs	 0.77	 	 	 	 	
11	 Labour	mobility	 0.46	 	 	 	 	
11	&	14	 Economic	growth	 	 	 	 	 0.19	
13	 Energy	(supplies)	 	 0.57	 	 	 0.37	
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Table	3.	Mean	Support	Levels	for	EU	Governance	in	Particular	Issues,	1962-2010	
Börzel	 Survey	Issue	Area	 1962	 1974	 1989	 1994	 2010	
13	 Transport	 	 	 	 	 0.08	
14	 Rising	prices	/	inflation	 	 0.46	 	 	 0.17	
14	&	18	 Tackling	public	debt	 	 	 	 	 -0.10	
14	&	12	 Reform/supervision	of	financial	sector	 	 	 	 	 0.23	
14	 Unemployment	 	 	 	 -0.04	 -0.09	
14	 Industrial	policy	 	 	 	 0.05	 	
15	 Agricultural	policy	/	fishing	policy	 0.64	 0.20	 	 	 0.02	
16	 Reducing	regional	econ.	diffs.	In	EU	 0.19	 0.18	 	 	 	
16	 Supporting	regions	in	econ.	Difficulties	 	 	 	 	 0.37	
17	 Currency	 	 	 0.19	 0.06	 	
18	 Rates	of	VAT	 	 	 0.16	 -0.01	 	
18	 Taxation	 	 	 	 	 -0.4	
N	 	 4774	 9060	 9885	 14063	 26723	
#states	 	 5	 9	 12	 15	 27	
Source:	 author’s	 calculations	 from	 (Press-	 and	 Information	 Service	 of	 the	 European	 Communities	 2011:	 Q21a&b)	 and	 Eurobarometer,	
various	years	(see	text).	
	
Table	4.	Mean	Support	Levels	for	EU	Governance	in	Particular	Issue,	EC-6	Only	
Börzel	 Survey	Issue	Area	 1962	 1974	 1989	 1994	 2010	
1	 Foreign	policy	/	international	influence	 0.56	 0.63	 0.56	 0.59	 	
1	 Security	against	external	threats	/	defence	 	 	 0.21	 0.28	 	
1	 Defence	&	foreign	affairs	 	 	 	 	 0.51	
1	&	3	 Fight	against	(international)	terrorism	 	 	 	 	 0.76	
2	 Humanitarian	aid	/	helping	countries	in	the	Third	World	 -0.07	 	 0.67	 0.66	 	
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Table	4.	Mean	Support	Levels	for	EU	Governance	in	Particular	Issue,	EC-6	Only	
Börzel	 Survey	Issue	Area	 1962	 1974	 1989	 1994	 2010	
3	 Protection	of	computer-based	information	on	individuals	 	 	 -0.04	 	 	
3	 Fighting	crime	 	 	 	 	 0.38	
3	 Fight	against	drugs	 	 	 	 0.56	 	
4	 Media	(broadcasting	and	press)	 	 	 0.14	 0.01	 	
4	 Workers'	reps.	on	company	boards	 	 	 -0.18	 -0.18	 	
4	 Immigration	policy	 	 	 	 0.27	 0.38	
4	 Political	asylum	 	 	 	 0.29	 	
5	 Environment	/	pollution	 	 0.54	 0.50	 0.38	 0.61	
5	 Consumer	protection	 	 	 	 	 0.17	
6	 Occupational	health	and	safety	 	 	 	 -0.13	 	
7	&	8	 Education	 0.72	 	 -0.27	 -0.32	 -0.33	
8	 Cultural	policy	 	 	 	 -0.18	 	
9	 Health	and	social	welfare	 0.76	 	 -0.20	 -0.33	 -0.19	
9	 Challenges	of	aging	population	/	pensions	 	 	 	 	 -0.53	
10	 Scientific	research	 0.78	 	 0.72	 0.58	 0.58	
11	 Abolition	of	tariffs	 0.77	 	 	 	 	
11	 Labour	mobility	 0.46	 	 	 	 	
11	&	
14	 Economic	growth	 	 	 	 	 0.31	
13	 Energy	(supplies)	 	 0.68	 	 	 0.53	
13	 Transport	 	 	 	 	 0.22	
14	 Rising	prices	/	inflation	 	 0.59	 	 	 0.36	
14	 Unemployment	 	 	 	 0.07	 -0.14	
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Table	4.	Mean	Support	Levels	for	EU	Governance	in	Particular	Issue,	EC-6	Only	
Börzel	 Survey	Issue	Area	 1962	 1974	 1989	 1994	 2010	
14	&	
18	 Tackling	public	debt	 	 	 	 	 -0.08	
14	&	
12	 Reform/supervision	of	financial	sector	 	 	 	 	 0.39	
14	 Industrial	policy	 	 	 	 0.21	 	
15	 Agricultural	policy	/	fishing	policy	 0.64	 0.31	 	 	 0.29	
16	 Reducing	regional	econ.	diffs.	In	EU	 0.19	 0.17	 	 	 	
16	 Supporting	regions	in	econ.	difficulties	 	 	 	 	 0.36	
17	 Currency	 	 	 0.36	 0.23	 	
18	 Rates	of	VAT	 	 	 0.36	 0.24	 	
18	 Taxation	 	 	 	 	 -0.42	
N	 	 4774	 5921	 4829	 5670	 5663	
(Italy	not	included	in	1962)		
	
Both	 tables	 generally	 support	 hypothesis	 1:	 for	 most	 issues,	 preferences	 remain	 relatively	 stable	
over	 time:	 preferences	 for	 foreign	 policy	 and	 scientific	 research,	 for	 example,	 have	 remained	
strongly	 pro-Europeanization	 since	 the	 very	 beginning;	 meanwhile,	 Eurobarometer	 respondents	
have	 been	 opposed,	 overall,	 to	 Europeanization	 in	 education	 and	 health/social	welfare.	 The	 1962	
survey	 is	 strikingly	 different	 on	 those	 issues,	 however,	with	 strong	 support	 for	 Europeanization	 in	
those	 areas.	 This	 difference	 is	 likely	 due	 to	 the	 much	 narrower	 question	 wording	 in	 1962	
(‘harmonisation	 of	 educational	 qualifications’	 vs.	 ‘education’	 and	 ‘equivalent	 social	 benefits’	 vs.	
‘health	and	social	welfare’).	Note	also	that	the	original	six	member	states,	the	only	states	polled	in	
1962,	are	systematically	more	positive	than	 later	 joiners,	as	a	comparison	between	Tables	3	and	4	
shows.	 In	 fact,	 this	 comparison	 suggests	 that	 apparent	 declines	 in	 support	 for	 Europeanization	
across	 issue	 areas	 are	 driven	more	 by	 the	 addition	 of	 sceptical	 national	 publics	 than	 by	 changing	
preferences	among	the	publics	of	existing	member	states.14	
Both	 tables	 also	 support	 the	 second	 part	 of	 hypothesis	 1,	 as	 well	 as	 hypothesis	 2:	 changes	 in	
European	 governance	 appear	 neither	 to	 be	 driven	 by	 nor	 to	 have	 much	 of	 an	 impact	 on	 issue-
specific	 preferences.	 Table	 1	 shows	 that	 Europeanization	 of	 foreign	 policy	went	 from	1	 to	 5	 from	
1957	 to	 2007,	while	 research	 and	development	went	 from	1	 to	 5.5.	 Yet,	 despite	 such	 similar	 and	
fairly	extensive	 changes	 in	Europeanization,	 the	 two	 issue	areas	 represent	both	 some	of	 the	most	
stable	 issue-preferences	over	time	and	some	of	 the	most	contrasting	ones	 (strongly	supportive	vs.	
strongly	 opposed).	 Similarly,	 education,	 where	 respondents	 have	 been	 consistently	 opposed	 to	
Europeanization	 since	 the	 1980s,	 has	 seen	 a	 large	 jump	 in	 European-level	 governance	 over	 that	
time.	 Meanwhile,	 environmental	 policy,	 where	 respondents	 have	 been	 systematically	 supportive	
since	the	1970s,	saw	large	jumps	in	1986	and	1992	with	no	changes	in	preference,	but	no	changes	in	
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governance	 since	 then,	 despite	 continued	 support	 for	 European	 governance	 (and	 even	 as	 further	
integration	occurred	in	other	issue	areas).		
By	way	of	 further	 illustrations,	consider	energy,	cohesion	and	employment	policies,	 studied	 in	 this	
issue	by	Eckert	and	Tömmel.	Citizens	strongly	supported	a	common	European	energy	policy	in	1974,	
but	as	Eckert	 (2016)	discusses	there	was	 little	or	no	progress	on	the	energy	front	during	the	years	
after	 that	 survey.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 cohesion	 policy,	 support	 levels	 for	 EU-level	 policies	 to	 reduce	
regional	economic	differences	 in	1962	and	1974	are	mildly	positive	but	clearly	 lower	 than	support	
for	most	other	issues.	However,	as	Tömmel	(2016)	notes,	cohesion	policy	was	set	up	in	1975,	after	
the	first	enlargement,	while	other	 issue	areas	remained	unaddressed	for	many	years.	Employment	
policy,	 finally,	was	 the	 ‘birthplace’	 of	 the	Open	Method	 of	 Coordination	 (OMC)	 in	 the	 late	 1990s,	
even	though	it	is	another	area	where	public	opinion	cannot	have	been	the	driver,	having	been	nearly	
neutral	since	the	mid-1990s.	
	
ISSUE-SPECIFIC	GOVERNANCE	AND	OVERALL	EU	SUPPORT	
Finally,	I	turn	to	the	impact	of	the	interaction	between	issue-specific	governance	and	preferences	for	
such	governance	on	overall	support	 for	European	 integration.	Since	question	wording	about	 issue-
specific	 preferences	 varies	 across	 surveys	 (‘joint’	 policy,	 ‘combined	 action’,	 ‘acting	 together’)	 and	
since	 issue	 areas	 vary	 as	 well,	 I	 conduct	 separate	 analyses	 for	 each	 survey.	 In	 order	 to	 test	
hypotheses	3-5,	I	run	an	ordered	logistic	regression	(logit),	with	overall	EU	support	as	the	dependent	
variable.	 Ordered	 logit	 is	 particularly	 well-suited	 to	 handle	 a	 small	 number	 of	 discrete,	 ordered	
outcomes,	 such	 as	 opposed,	 neutral,	 and	 in	 favour,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 here.	 Logit	 coefficients	 can	 be	
converted	 to	 odds	 ratios,	 which	 have	 a	 more	 straightforward	 interpretation	 than	 the	 coefficient	
estimates	themselves.	Odds	ratios	are	expressed	relative	to	a	value	of	1	(representing	no	change	in	
the	odds	of	 a	higher	outcome):	1.25	means	a	25	per	 cent	greater	 likelihood	of	 a	higher	outcome,	
whereas	0.75	means	25	per	cent	lower	odds	of	a	higher	outcome.	The	regression	results	presented	
below	are	all	expressed	as	odds	ratios.		
In	 order	 to	 adjust	 for	 the	dramatically	 different	 sizes	 of	 national	 populations,	 the	model	 is	 set	 up	
with	 individual	 countries	 identified	 as	 survey	 strata	 and	 with	 weights	 to	 correct	 for	 different	
sampling	rates	across	states.15	All	 issue	areas	queried	in	a	particular	survey	are	included	in	a	single	
model	to	reduce	the	risk	of	omitted	variable	bias	(preferences	for	Europeanization	in	different	issue	
areas	may	 well	 be	 correlated).	 In	 addition,	 since	 it	 is	 well	 established	 that	 support	 for	 European	
integration	systematically	differs	across	member	states,	each	analysis	features	dummy	variables	for	
individual	member	states.16	Finally,	I	add	controls	for	three	standard	demographic	variables	that	are	
known	 to	 be	 causally	 related	 to	 general	 EU	 support	 and	 are	 also	 causally	 prior	 to	 support	 for	
Europeanization	 in	 particular	 issue	 areas:	 gender,	 age	 and	 education	 level.	 In	 order	 to	 conserve	
space	 and	 to	 keep	 the	 focus	 on	 the	 issue	 areas,	 the	 tables	 do	 not	 list	 the	 estimates	 for	 these	
additional	variables.17	
The	 hypotheses	 can	 effectively	 be	 split	 into	 two	 separate	 hypotheses,	 depending	 on	 whether	 a	
respondent	supports	or	opposes	joint	European	action.	However,	those	two	options	will	generally	be	
highly	 correlated,	 as	 a	 respondent	 can	 choose	 only	 support	 or	 opposition,	 or	 else	 indicate	 no	
preference.	Rather	than	ignoring	the	no	preference	category	(generally	expressed	as	a	‘don’t	know’	
answer),	 it	makes	more	sense	to	run	the	analyses	separately.	Accordingly,	each	of	 the	subsequent	
analyses	separately	displays	coefficient	estimates	for	the	impact	of	supporting	Europeanization	and	
for	opposing	it	(or	rather,	preferring	national	action).		
Table	5	reports	the	analysis	of	the	1962	‘Attitudes	toward	Europe’	survey.	This	survey	not	only	offers	
the	 earliest	 systematic	 evidence	 available	 about	 citizen	 preferences	 for	 Europeanization,	 but	 also	
queried	 respondent	 beliefs	 about	 whether	 Europeanization	 in	 particular	 issue	 areas	 was	 already	
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‘foreseen’	in	the	EC	Treaties	(beliefs	that	were	fairly	accurate,	as	seen	above).	This	makes	it	possible	
to	ascertain	whether	those	beliefs	have	an	impact	on	generalised	support	for	European	integration.	
The	table	shows	the	odds	ratio	estimates	for	supporting	(or	opposing)	Europeanization,	as	well	as	for	
an	interaction	term	between	the	former	and	the	belief	that	Europeanization	is	foreseen	in	that	issue	
area.		
	
Table	5.	Analysis	for	Attitudes	towards	Europe	1962	(EC-6,	N	=	4736)	
Issue	Area	 Level	 For	 	 Against	 	
Abolition	of	tariffs	(support)	 4	 1.50	 ***	 0.32	 ***	
Labour	mobility	(support)	 4	 1.19	 ***	 0.78	 ***	
Harmonising	educational	qualifications	(support)	 1.5	 1.26	 ***	 0.87	 ***	
Foreign	policy	(support)	 1	 1.52	 ***	 0.82	 ***	
Scientific	research	(support)	 1	 1.14	 ***	 0.52	 ***	
Agricultural	policy	(support)	 7	 1.47	 ***	 0.64	 ***	
Social	benefits	(support)	 1	 1.15	 +	 0.85	 +	
Taxes	for	cross-regional	redistribution	(support)	 3.5	 1.54	 ***	 0.89	 ***	
Taxes	for	Africa	(support)	 3.5	 0.80	 **	 2.22	 **	
Abolition	of	tariffs	(support	&	expect)	 4	 1.46	 **	 0.68	 **	
Labour	mobility	(support	&	expect)	 4	 0.97	 ***	 1.11	 ***	
Harmonising	qualifications	(support	&	expect)	 1.5	 1.12	 ***	 2.60	 ***	
Foreign	policy	(support	&	expect)	 1	 1.03	 ***	 0.42	 ***	
Scientific	research	(support	&	expect)	 1	 1.18	 	 0.72	
	
Agricultural	policy	(support	&	expect)	 7	 1.22	 ***	 0.53	 ***	
Social	benefits	(support	&	expect)	 1	 1.17	 	 0.67	
	
Taxes	for	redistribution	(support	&	expect)	 3.5	 0.79	 ***	 1.25	 ***	
Taxes	for	Africa	(support	&	expect)	 3.5	 1.77	 	 1.82	
	
Ordered	 logistic	 regression,	 reporting	odds	 ratios,	weighted	 to	adjust	 for	 country	population	 size.	 Statistical	 significance:	***	0.001,	**	
0.01,	*	0.05,	+	0.1.	
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First,	 the	 link	between	 issue-specific	 support	and	general	 support	 for	European	 integration	 is	both	
statistically	 significant	 and	 in	 the	direction	predicted	by	H3	 for	most	 issues	 (with	 the	exception	of	
taxes	 for	Africa):	 the	odds	 ratios	 for	 the	 ‘for’	 regression	 are	 greater	 than	1	 (issue-specific	 support	
makes	 overall	 support	more	 likely),	 while	 those	 for	 the	 ‘against’	 regression	 are	 smaller	 than	 one	
(opposition	makes	 overall	 support	 less	 likely).	 Moreover,	 the	 estimated	 size	 of	 the	 effects	 varies	
considerably,	in	line	with	the	prediction	of	H4.	On	the	‘for’	side,	the	average	effect	size	for	the	five	
issue	areas	where	real	Europeanization	is	taking	place	(level	of	3.5	or	higher)	is	38	per	cent,	whereas	
the	average	estimate	 for	 the	other	 four	 issue	areas	 is	much	 lower	at	27	per	cent.	 Indeed,	 the	two	
lowest	 estimates	 occur	 where	 no	 integration	 is	 taking	 place.	 On	 the	 negative	 side,	 the	 picture	 is	
similar	(52	per	cent	for	the	five	Europeanizing	areas;	24	per	cent	for	the	others).		
The	estimate	for	‘taxes	for	Africa’	is	surprising,	as	the	‘for’	column	should	contain	positive	effects:	if	
a	respondent	supports	Europeanization	in	an	issue	area,	s/he	ought	also	to	support	the	EC	overall.	
However,	on	this	question,	supporting	Europeanization	makes	the	respondent	less	likely	to	support	
the	 EC;	 conversely,	 opposing	 it	 makes	 her/him	 more	 supportive	 of	 the	 EC.	 This	 suggests	 that	
respondents	associate	the	EC	with	policies	that	are	at	odds	with	direct	taxation	for	redistribution	to	
Africa,	 perhaps	 because	 the	 EC	 is	 seen	 primarily	 as	 a	 market-	 (not	 government-)	 focused,	 non-
redistributive	 organisation.	 This	 possibility	 is	 given	 additional	 support	 by	 the	 interaction	 effects	 in	
the	 bottom	half	 of	 the	 table,	where	 the	 other	 redistributive	 policy	 (across	 regions	within	 Europe)	
also	has	an	effect	in	the	opposite	direction,	reducing	the	non-interacted	effect	size.		
The	 interaction	 effects	 also	 support	 the	 final	 hypothesis,	 H5.	 Coefficient	 estimates	 are	 not	
statistically	 significant	 in	 two	 issue	 areas	 without	 integration	 (along	 with	 the	 taxation	 for	 Africa	
issue).	Meanwhile,	the	largest	significant	estimate	on	the	‘for’	side	is	on	tariff	abolition,	where	real	
Europeanization	was	indeed	taking	place	at	the	time.18	Most	significantly,	combining	the	estimated	
effect	 sizes	 that	 are	 statistically	 significant	 (since	 respondents	 who	 expect	 and	 support	
Europeanization	also	simply	support	it)	the	two	largest	positive	effects	on	the	‘for’	side	are	on	tariff	
abolition	(1.50*1.46	=	2.20)	and	agricultural	policy	(1.47*1.22	=	1.79),	and	the	two	largest	negative	
effects	 on	 the	 ‘against’	 side	 are	 for	 those	 same	 two	 policies.	 In	 other	 words,	 and	 exactly	 as	
predicted,	the	greatest	impact,	in	the	positive	as	well	as	the	negative	direction,	comes	among	those	
who	are	aware	of	actual	Europeanization	and	occurs	 in	 the	two	 issue	areas	representing	the	most	
visible	and	salient	EC	initiatives	at	the	time:	abolition	of	tariffs	and	agricultural	support.		
Table	 6	 shows	 the	 results	 of	 the	 analysis	 for	 1974	 (EB	2),	which	 are	 again	 in	 accordance	with	 the	
general	 prediction:	 issue-specific	 preferences	 are	 associated	 with	 an	 effect	 on	 overall	 support.	
Moreover,	 the	single	weakest	estimate	(neither	statistically	significant	nor	an	estimated	odds	ratio	
that	is	far	from	1)	is	for	environmental	protection,	an	issue	area	without	any	real	Europeanization	at	
the	time.	However,	 the	other	area	with	 little	real	Europeanization,	diplomacy,	musters	a	 large	and	
significant	estimated	effect.	This	was	evident	in	1962	as	well:	strong	supporters	of	a	joint	European	
foreign	policy	also	tend	to	support	European	integration	overall,	regardless	of	how	much	actual	joint	
foreign	policy	takes	place.	Still,	even	with	this	outlier	included,	there	is	a	positive	(albeit	weakened)	
correlation	 between	 the	 level	 of	 Europeanization	 in	 an	 issue	 area	 and	 the	 estimated	 effect	 of	
support	for	such	Europeanization	on	general	support	for	European	integration,	as	H4	predicts.19		
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Table	6.	Analysis	for	EB	2,	1974	(EC-9,	N	=	8234)	
Issue	Area	 Level	 For	 	 Against	 	
Regional	redistribution	 3.5	 1.55	 ***	 0.68	 ***	
Fight	inflation		 3	 1.47	 ***	 0.62	 ***	
Energy	policy		 3.5	 1.75	 ***	 0.50	 ***	
Agriculture	 7	 1.40	 ***	 0.82	 **	
Environmental	protection	 1	 1.01	 	 0.94	 	
Diplomacy	 1	 1.70	 ***	 0.64	 ***	
Ordered	logit,	reporting	odds	ratios.	Weighted	to	adjust	for	country	population	size.	Statistical	significance:	***	0.001,	**	0.01,	*	0.05.		
	
Table	7	shows,	side	by	side,	 the	results	 for	surveys	 in	1989	and	1994.	The	Maastricht	Treaty	came	
into	 effect	 in	 the	 interim,	 so	 European	 governance	 levels	 were	 considerably	 higher	 in	 1994.	
Nevertheless,	 results	 for	 both	 surveys	 support	H3	 as	well	 as	H4.	 Indeed,	 the	 correlation	 between	
European	 governance	 level	 and	 estimated	 odds	 ratios	 is	 positive	 for	 those	 who	 support	
Europeanization	and	negative	for	those	who	oppose	it.20	Lack	of	statistical	significance	is	more	likely	
to	 occur	 in	 issue	 areas	with	 little	 or	 no	 Europeanization	 (in	 1989)	 or,	 after	 the	Maastricht	 Treaty,	
with	 comparatively	 less	 Europeanization.	 More	 substantively,	 in	 1994,	 monetary	 integration	
(‘currency’)	 has	 the	 largest	 estimated	effect	 size;	 this	was	 also	 the	 area	 that	 had	 seen	 the	 largest	
(and	most	 visible)	 increase	 in	 Europeanization.	 Similarly,	 the	 area	 of	 security/defence,	 where	 the	
Maastricht	Treaty	had	also	brought	highly	visible	Europeanization	in	the	form	of	a	Common	Foreign	
and	Security	Policy,	had	the	second	largest	effect	sizes	in	1994.21		
	
Table	7.	Analysis	for	EB	32	(1989,	EU-12)	and	EB	42.0	(1994,	EU-15)	
Issue	Area	 	 1989	 	 	 1994	 	
	 Level	 For	 Against	 Level	 For	 Against	
Security	and	Defence		 2	 1.35	***	
0.75	
***	 4	
1.44	
***	
0.73	
***	
Protection	of	the	environment	 6	 1.27	***	
0.80	
***	 8	
1.17	
**	
0.86	
***	
Currency		 2.5	 1.73	***	
0.63	
***	 8	
2.04	
***	
0.50	
***	
Co-operation	with	LDCs,	Third	
World	 3.5	
1.42	
***	
0.71	
***	 7	 1.10	
0.88	
+	
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Table	7.	Analysis	for	EB	32	(1989,	EU-12)	and	EB	42.0	(1994,	EU-15)	
Issue	Area	 	 1989	 	 	 1994	 	
Health	and	social	welfare		 1	 1.20	**	
0.83	
***	 4.5	
1.16	
*	 0.94	
Education		 1.5	 1.03	 0.98		 3.75	 1.08	 0.96	
Basic	rules	for	media		 1	 1.20	***	
0.91	
+	 5.5	
1.15	
*	 0.93	
Scientific	research		 5	 1.08	 0.93	 5	 1.03	 0.90	
Rates	of	VAT		 3	 1.05	 1.03	 3	 1.28	***	
0.87	
**	
Foreign	policy	outside	the	
European	Community		 2	
1.32	
***	
0.89	
+	 4	
1.41	
***	
0.72	
***	
Workers’	representatives	on	
company	boards		 1	
1.16	
*	 1.04	 5.5	 1.05	 1.04	
Computer	privacy		 1	 1.03	 1.14	*	 	 	 	
Industrial	policy	 	 	 	 3	 1.20	***	
0.85	
**	
Cultural	policy	 	 	 	 2	 0.91	 1.21	***	
Immigration	policy	 	 	 	 5.5	 1.14	*	
0.84	
**	
Rules	for	political	asylum	 	 	 	 5.5	 1.33	***	
0.78	
***	
Health	and	safety	of	workers	 	 	 	 7	 1.12	+	 0.91	
The	fight	against	unemployment	 	 	 	 3	 1.16	**	
0.83	
***	
The	fight	against	drugs	 	 	 	 3	 1.03	 0.94	
N	 	 11492	 11492	 	 13030	 13043	
Ordered	 logistic	 regression,	weighted	 to	adjust	 for	country	population	size.	Reporting	odds	 ratios;	 statistical	 significance:	***	0.001,	**	
0.01,	*	0.05,	+	0.1.	
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EB	 74.2	 (2010)	 is	 the	 final	 survey	 considered	 here.	 It	 was	 conducted	 after	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty	 had	
come	into	effect,	and	well	into	the	global	financial	crisis.	The	results	of	the	analysis	are	displayed	in	
the	 columns	 labeled	 ‘for’	 and	 ‘against’	 of	 Table	 8.	 The	 correlation	 between	 governance	 level	 and	
effect	size	is	once	again	statistically	significant	in	both	models	(at	the	0.001	level)	and	estimates	that	
are	not	statistically	significant	disproportionately	occur	 in	 issue	areas	where	there	is	comparatively	
less	Europeanization.	The	two	most	Europeanized	issue	areas,	agriculture/fisheries	and	support	for	
troubled	 regions,	 also	 boast	 two	 of	 the	 five	 highest	 effects	 in	 the	 ‘for’	 column.	 The	 other	 issues	
among	those	five,	immigration,	inflation	and	financial	reform,	not	only	boast	above-average	levels	of	
Europeanized	governance,	they	are	also	all	made	more	salient	by	the	ongoing	economic	crisis.		
Table	8	also	offers	another	test	of	hypothesis	H5,	in	the	final	two	columns.	These	report	the	results	
of	the	same	analysis,	but	conducted	only	on	the	subset	of	the	population	that	correctly	answered	all	
three	political	 knowledge	questions.	Here	every	 statistically	 significant	effect	 size	 is	 greater	 (or,	 in	
two	cases,	equal)	when	the	sample	is	limited	to	the	most	knowledgeable	respondents,	as	predicted.	
In	most	cases,	however,	 the	difference	 is	comparatively	small.	This	 is	almost	certainly	 reflective	of	
the	fact	that	the	political	knowledge	questions	were	not	issue-specific;	it	seems	likely	that	those	with	
more	general	political	knowledge	will	also	have	more	 issue-specific	knowledge	of	Europeanization,	
but	the	difference	on	the	latter	front	may	be	quite	small.	
	
Table	8.	Analysis	for	EB	74.2,	2010,	EU-27	
Issue	Area	 Level	 For	 Against	 For*	 Against*	
Fighting	crime		 5	 0.98	 1.01	 1.01	 1.00	
Taxation		 3	
0.88	
*	
1.17	
**	
1.02	 0.92	
Fighting	unemployment		 5.5	 1.03	 0.97	 0.99	 1.04	
Fighting	terrorism		 6.5	 0.95	 0.97	 1.03	 0.93	
Defence	and	foreign	affairs		 5	
1.17	
**	
0.85	
**	
1.21	
*	
0.85	
+	
Immigration		 7.5	
1.32	
***	
0.75	
***	
1.34	
***	
0.74	
***	
The	education	system		 6.25	 1.09	 0.93	
1.18	
+	
0.90	
Pensions		 5.5	 0.92	 1.08	
0.81	
*	
1.18	
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Table	8.	Analysis	for	EB	74.2,	2010,	EU-27	
Issue	Area	 Level	 For	 Against	 For*	 Against*	
Protecting	the	environment		 8	
1.16	
**	
0.85	
**	
1.37	
***	
0.73	
***	
Health		 5.5	
0.86	
**	
1.13	
*	
0.82	
*	
1.18	
+	
Agriculture	and	fishery		 8.5	
1.20	
***	
0.84	
***	
1.44	
***	
0.68	
***	
Consumer	protection		 8	 1.08	
0.91	
+	
1.08	 0.90	
Scient.	&	technol.	research		 5.5	 0.98	 1.07	 0.88	 1.17	
Support	for	troubled	regions		 8.5	
1.29	
***	
0.78	
***	
1.33	
***	
0.74	
***	
Energy		 7.5	
1.23	
***	
0.80	
***	
1.29	
**	
0.77	
**	
Transport		 7.5	 1.08	 0.96	 0.97	 1.03	
Fighting	inflation		 5.5	
1.17	
**	
0.86	
**	
1.14	 0.90	
Economic	growth	 6.75	 1.02	 0.94	 1.06	 0.94	
Tackling	public	debt		 4.25	
0.80	
***	
1.27	
***	
0.80	
*	
1.30	
**	
Reform	the	financial	sector		 6.25	
1.27	
***	
0.83	
***	
1.33	
**	
0.79	
*	
N	 	 26723	 	 10019	 	
Ordered	logistic	regression,	weighted,	reporting	odds	ratios.	Statistical	significance:	***	0.001,	**	0.01,	*	0.05,	+	0.1.		
	
	
Volume	12,	Issue	1	(2016)	 	 A.	Maurits	van	der	Veen	
	 586	
CONCLUSION	
Over	 the	 course	 of	 half	 a	 century,	 as	 citizens	 of	 EU	member	 states	 have	 been	 asked	 about	 their	
preferences	for	national	versus	European-level	governance	in	specific	issue	areas,	a	few	key	patterns	
have	emerged.	First,	preferences	remain	fairly	consistent	from	one	survey	to	the	next,	especially	in	
terms	 of	 their	 relative	 rank	 ordering.	 Second,	 the	 apparent	 decline	 over	 time	 in	 support	 for	
Europeanization	 in	many	 issue	 areas	 appears	 driven	more	 by	 the	 addition	 of	 new	member	 state	
publics	 than	by	 significant	 changes	 in	 the	preferences	of	 citizens	of	 long-time	member	 states.	The	
analyses	 presented	 here	 confirm	 these	 patterns.	 In	 addition,	 they	 also	 illustrate	 that	 changes	 in	
issue-specific	 European	 governance	 are	 not	 driven	 by	 public	 preferences	 for	 Europeanization	 in	
those	issue	areas	(nor,	conversely,	are	such	preferences	affected	by	those	changes).	
More	 importantly,	 this	 article	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 interaction	 between	 preferences	 for	 issue-
specific	 European	governance	and	Europeanization	 in	 those	 issue	 areas	has	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	
overall	 support	 for	 the	 EU.	 It	 is	 perhaps	 not	 surprising	 that	 issue-specific	 support	 for	 EU-level	
governance	has	a	positive	effect	on	overall	EU	support.	However,	the	fact	that	the	size	of	this	effect	
increases	with	the	degree	of	Europeanization	in	the	issue	area	in	question	had	not	previously	been	
demonstrated,	nor	had	the	role	of	political	knowledge	in	strengthening	the	effect.	
The	data	show	that	higher	levels	of	issue-specific	Europeanization	are	systematically	associated	with	
an	estimated	impact	on	overall	EU	support	that	is	both	larger	and	more	statistically	significant.	The	
fact	 that	 this	 finding	 emerges	 despite	 the	 serious	 data	 limitations	 constraining	 the	 analysis	—	an	
inevitably	 imperfect	measure	of	 Europeanization,	 a	 frequently	 poor	match	between	 that	measure	
and	 the	 issue	 areas	 polled,	 and	 a	 limited	 question	 instrument	 in	 those	 surveys	 (offering	 no	
gradation)	—	suggests	that	the	actual	pattern	is	likely	stronger	than	that	found	here.	In	addition,	the	
significance	 of	 the	 finding	 is	 further	 strengthened	 by	 the	 time	 period	 covered	 by	 the	 surveys	
analysed	here,	from	as	early	as	1962	to	as	recently	as	2010.22	
The	first	and	last	surveys	analysed	also	underscored	the	role	of	political	knowledge	in	the	observed	
patterns.	 When	 respondents	 in	 1962	 were	 queried	 as	 to	 which	 issue	 areas	 were	 likely	 to	 see	
Europeanization	 in	 the	near	 future,	 their	 belief	 that	 European-level	 governance	 in	 particular	 issue	
areas	was	‘foreseen’	in	the	Treaties	further	strengthened	their	support	for	Europeanization	overall.	
Similarly,	 in	 2010,	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 interaction	 between	 Europeanization	 and	 issue-specific	
preferences	on	overall	EU	support	was	greater	for	the	subset	of	the	population	that	scored	highest	
on	political	knowledge.23		
Overall,	these	findings	underscore	the	 importance	of	taking	 into	account	 issue-specific	preferences	
in	any	discussion	of	 support	 for	European	 integration.	The	evidence	presented	here	 indicates	 that	
issue-specific	preferences	have	a	strong	impact	on	overall	support,	especially	when	governance	has	
been	Europeanized	in	the	issue	areas	in	question.	This	has	significant	implications	too	for	European	
policy-makers	who	until	now	have	 focused	more	on	overall	 support	 for	European	 integration	 than	
on	issue-specific	preferences.	After	all,	European	governance	is	much	more	likely	to	be	successful	if	
it	enjoys	public	support.	
The	 analyses	 in	 this	 article	 also	 challenge	 one	 common	 interpretation	 of	 (soft)	 Euroscepticism	 as	
resulting	from	an	ever-expanding	EU	matched	against	publics	with	fairly	constant	preferences.	While	
greater	 Europeanization	 in	 issue	 areas	 where	 respondents	 are	 opposed	 to	 such	 integration	 does	
reduce	overall	support	for	the	EU,	the	opposite	is	the	case	as	well:	Europeanization	can	also	increase	
overall	 support.	 For	 further	 integration	 to	 drive	 Euroscepticism,	 one	 of	 two	 scenarios	must	 hold.	
First,	 integration	 might	 take	 place	 primarily	 in	 issue	 areas	 where	 publics	 are	 inclined	 to	 oppose	
Europeanization.	The	analyses	here	show	this	not	to	be	the	case.	Second,	Euroscepticism	might	be	
on	the	rise	primarily	in	countries	where	citizens	are	inclined	to	oppose	Europeanization.	This,	too,	is	
at	 odds	 with	 the	 evidence:	 the	 analyses	 here	 show	 publics	 in	 the	 original	 member	 states	 to	 be	
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comparatively	 pro-Europeanization,	 yet	 Euroscepticism	 has	 risen	 dramatically	 in	 original	 member	
states	such	as	France	and	the	Netherlands	in	recent	years.	
Finally,	the	findings	here	call	into	question	widespread	scepticism	about	the	awareness	of	European	
integration	among	European	citizens.	The	 fact	 that	actual	Europeanization	 levels	have	a	significant	
effect	on	the	relationship	between	issue-specific	preferences	and	overall	support	implicitly	indicates	
that	 Europeans	 must	 be	 somehow	 aware	 of	 those	 Europeanization	 levels;	 the	 fact	 that	 political	
knowledge	 strengthens	 the	 relationship	 explicitly	 confirms	 it.	 Although	 citizens	 tend	 to	 perform	
poorly	on	specific	knowledge	‘trivia’	questions,	a	general	awareness	of	political	initiatives	is	arguably	
more	significant	 to	 their	 competence	as	voters.	Whether	 this	awareness	 is	 conveyed	 in	 the	media	
(Schuck,	Xezonakis,	Elenbaas,	Banducci,	and	De	Vreese	2011)	or	through	party	cues	(Hobolt	2007),	
the	evidence	suggests	that,	where	it	matters,	voters	are	more	informed	than	is	widely	believed.	
***	
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1 In	 contrast	 to	 ‘hard	 euroscepticism’,	 which	 ‘implies	 outright	 rejection	 of	 the	 entire	 project	 of	 European	 political	 and	
economic	integration’,	‘soft	euroscepticism’	is	‘contingent	or	qualified	opposition	to	European	integration	…	expressed	in	
terms	of	opposition	to	specific	extensions	of	EU	competencies’	(Taggart	and	Szczerbiak	2004:	4).	
2	To	some	degree,	the	causal	arrow	works	both	ways:	someone	who	supports	European	integration	overall	is	more	likely	to	
support	 European	 governance	 in	 a	 given	 issue	 area	 (e.g.	 Ray	 2004).	 However,	 the	 interaction	 of	 this	 effect	with	 actual	
Europeanization	(H4)	is	unlikely	to	be	driven	by	overall	support,	unless	an	individual	is	simply	rationalising.	Moreover,	the	
impact	of	overall	support	on	issue-specific	preferences	ought	to	be	constant	across	issues;	in	fact,	however,	the	observed	
effect	is	variable,	suggesting	that	the	causal	arrow	is	primarily	in	the	direction	posited	here.	
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3	In	fact,	despite	occasional	attempts	by	the	member	states	legally	to	proscribe	‘creeping	competence’	(Pollack	1995)	such	
as	the	principle	of	‘conferred	powers’	in	the	Treaty	of	Maastricht,	key	Treaty	provisions	permit	the	EU	to	adopt	measures	in	
line	with	general	Treaty	objectives	even	without	specific	legal	basis	(cf.	Conway	2010).	
4	In	 fact,	 the	 output	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 in	 terms	 of	 directives,	 regulations,	 and	 expenditures	 also	 represents	 an	
imperfect	measure	 of	 the	 impact	 or	 pervasiveness	 of	 EU	 governance	 across	 different	 issue	 areas	 (Pollack	 1995,	 2000).	
Moreover,	 to	get	any	sense	of	the	 importance	of	EU-level	relative	to	national-level	governance,	comparable	 information	
about	national	directives,	expenditures,	etc.	would	be	required.	
5	Treaty	data	do	not	shed	any	 light	on	whether	or	not	the	EU	is	actually	using	 its	competences,	a	point	made	by	several	
scholars	who	prefer	the	regulation-counting	approach	(e.g.	Alesina,	Angeloni	and	Schuknecht	2002).	Fortunately,	Börzel’s	
codes	 are	 largely	 congruent	with	 assessments	 produced	 by	 other	 approaches,	 including	 those	 focusing	 on	 legislative	&	
financial	output	(Alesina	et	al.	2002;	Pollack	2000;	Schmitter	1996).	
6	For	 countries	 not	 in	 the	 Eurozone,	 the	 correct	 figure	will	 be	 lower.	 Still,	 even	 they	 are	 constrained	 in	 their	 ability	 to	
implement	an	independent	monetary	policy;	accordingly,	I	do	not	adjust	the	code	for	respondents	from	those	countries.	
7	Individual-level	data	for	the	 Italian	sample	 is	unavailable	for	this	survey,	so	the	analysis	here	covers	only	the	other	five	
original	member	states.	
8	In	the	Dutch	questionnaire,	this	question	better	translates	as	‘being	considered’	(overwogen)	rather	than	‘provided	for’.	
The	German	 (vorgesehen)	 and	 French	 (prévu)	 versions	—	 both	 of	which	 literally	 translate	 as	 ‘foreseen’	—	 are	more	 in	
accordance	with	the	English	‘provided	for’.	Short	of	excluding	the	Dutch	sub-sample,	there	is	no	obvious	way	to	correct	for	
these	linguistic	differences.	
9	Across	all	surveys	considered	here,	‘don’t	know’	answers	generally	accounted	for	5-7	per	cent	of	all	responses.	I	 ignore	
these	 answers	 in	 the	 calculation	 of	mean	 support	 levels,	 and	 code	 them	 as	 the	 null	 category	 for	 the	 dummy	 variables	
reflecting	support	for	or	opposition	to	EU-level	governance.	
10	The	three	true/false	questions	were:	 ‘The	EU	currently	consists	of	27	member	states’	 (true	 in	2010),	 ‘The	members	of	
the	European	Parliament	are	directly	elected	by	the	citizens	of	each	Member	State’	(true),	and	‘Switzerland	is	a	member	of	
the	EU’	(false).	
11	Answers	to	these	various	questions,	when	asked	within	the	same	survey,	are	strongly	correlated.	
12	The	autumn	1995	Eurobarometer	(42.0)	was	conducted	a	month	or	two	prior	to	the	official	accession	of	Austria,	Finland,	
and	Sweden,	but	respondents	in	those	countries	already	knew	their	country	would	join	the	EU	in	1995.	
13	As	noted	earlier,	some	issue	areas	queried	in	the	surveys	constitute	only	one	small	part	of	one	of	the	broader	issue	areas	
in	Börzel’s	list.	Meanwhile,	others	may	cross	issue-area	boundaries,	as	indicated	by	listing	two	numbers	in	the	first	column	
of	Tables	3	and	4.	
14 	Actually,	 unlike	 other	 late	 joiners,	 the	 Central	 and	 East	 European	 (CEE)	 member	 states	 are	 about	 equally	 pro-
Europeanization	as	 the	EC-6,	on	average.	However,	 their	 issue-specific	preferences	do	differ.	 For	example,	 the	CEEs	are	
much	 less	opposed	 to	Europeanized	anti-unemployment	efforts,	education	policy,	pension	policy,	and	health	policy,	but	
much	more	opposed	to	Europeanized	agricultural	policy,	anti-inflation	policy	and	environmental	protection.	
15	Using	 the	 Stata	 statistical	 package,	 the	 command	 is	 svy:	 ologit,	with	 Eurobarometer’s	 ‘weight	 Europe’	 as	 the	pweight	
variable.	 For	 the	 1962	 survey,	 weights	 were	 calculated	 by	 the	 author,	 based	 on	 the	 size	 of	 each	 national	 sample	 and	
national	population	sizes	in	1962.	
16	Germany,	the	largest	member	state,	is	the	baseline	case.		
17	Full	regression	results	for	all	analyses	reported	and	discussed	here	are	available	from	the	author.	
18	On	the	‘against’	side,	there	is	less	of	a	clear	pattern,	apart	from	the	non-significant	estimates	already	noted.	This	is	not	
all	that	surprising,	as	Table	2	showed	that	the	proportion	of	respondents	opposing	Europeanization	was	low	on	average,	
producing	just	a	small	number	of	observations	to	work	with.	
19	In	 the	 absence	 of	 information	 regarding	 respondents’	 beliefs,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 derive	 further	 insights.	 For	 example,	
perhaps	the	estimated	effect	for	agriculture	is	smaller	than	that	for	the	first	three	issue	areas	listed	because	respondents	
see	most	actual	agricultural	policy	being	implemented	at	the	national	level,	in	the	form	of	price	supports.	
20	However,	the	correlation	reaches	statistical	significance	only	for	the	1994	survey,	and	then	only	at	the	0.1	level,	so	the	
pattern	is	not	as	strong	as	for	some	of	the	other	surveys.	
21	Foreign	policy	is	nearly	tied	with	security/defence	in	terms	of	effect	size	in	1994.	Recall,	however,	that	diplomacy/foreign	
policy	already	generated	large	and	statistically	significant	odds	ratio	estimates	in	earlier	surveys,	so	the	same	results	here	
do	not	represent	a	change.	
22	Moreover,	performing	the	same	analysis	on	additional	surveys	within	this	time	period	produces	substantively	equivalent	
results,	 further	supporting	the	hypotheses.	For	example,	 in	1984	(EB	22),	 there	 is	a	strong	and	significant	correlation	on	
both	 sides	 (0.73	 for	 ‘for’	 and	 -0.70	 for	 ‘against’)	 between	 the	 estimated	 odds	 ratios	 and	 the	 level	 of	 Europeanization.	
Moreover,	the	two	issue	areas	with	no	real	Europeanization	generate	effect	sizes	that	are	not	(or	only	barely)	statistically	
significant.	 Similarly,	 in	 1999	 (EB	 52.0)	 every	 issue	 area	 with	 a	 Europeanization	 level	 of	 7	 or	 higher	 has	 statistically	
significant	 estimates	 in	 both	 the	 ‘for’	 and	 ‘against’	 columns.	Among	 the	 remaining	 20	 issue	 areas,	 only	 three	meet	 this	
same	standard.	
23	Here,	again,	the	fact	that	this	finding	emerged	despite	the	tenuous	relationship	between	general	(and	fairly	superficial)	
knowledge	 about	 the	 EU	 and	 specific	 knowledge	 about	 Europeanization	 in	 particular	 issue	 areas	 suggests	 that	 the	 real	
impact	of	such	knowledge	is	likely	greater	than	found	in	this	analysis.	
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